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Abstract: One important issue in firms’ governance is how to create incentives so that 
activity centres can become more efficient. In this paper, we first introduce an agency contract 
where the salary of the manager of an activity centre that produces an intermediate product is 
dependent of its performance. Secondly, we add competition within the organization. This 
latter point is new in the literature. We then develop a "static analysis" comparing a firm that 
has only one activity centre producing an intermediate product with another firm that has two 
activity centres producing the same intermediate product, in a context where the technology 
manifests increasing returns to scale. We conclude that the introduction of internal 
competition makes the firm globally more efficient, even though it cannot fully explore the 
existence of increasing returns to scale. 
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1. Introduction 
In a systemic analysis, an organization is a space that internalizes the transactions that are 
globally more efficient to undertake within it than in the market (Coase, 1937). The 
transaction costs considered in the literature are information, implementation, negotiation, and 
information costs.  But, even if there were no costs in using the market, there are benefits with 
the accomplishment of transactions within the organization (Conner, 1991). 
On the other hand, each organization is subject to an environment in continuous change, 
which is reflected in the variation of prices of inputs and outputs. Therefore, it is necessary to 
implement management strategies that supply permanently information on the relative 
efficiency of each transaction in order to ascertain which transactions should be internalized 
and/or externalized. However, there is dependence between transactions, so implying that it is 
not always possible to determine the relative efficiency of each transaction. In this context, it 
is necessary to identify, first, the dependence among transactions and, second, mutually 
independent sub-systems. The analysis of the efficiency of these sub-systems, designed as 
activity centres, is one of the basic concerns of the management accounting and control 
systems (Kaplan and Cooper, 1998). 
Given that an activity centre use inputs that are the outputs of other activity centres, it is 
necessary to determine the transfer price of each intermediate product/service in order allocate 
resources efficiently (Atkinson, 1987).  Since both variable and fixed cost costs have to be 
covered, the problem of the determination of the transfer price, as well as the corresponding 
distribution of costs, is identical to the macroeconomic problem of determination of the price 
in a planned economy (Ijiri, 1968, Livingstone, 1969, Farag, 1967, 1968, and Kaplan, 1973), 
which uses the input-output analysis of Leontief (1941).  According with this perspective, the 
organization is managed centrally, where activity centres are planned in order to maximize the 
overall profit. 
However, the organization can only be managed efficiently if there is perfect information 
(Hayek, 1945). Although the absence of perfect information can be partially resolved in 
perfectly competitive markets, where economic agents disclose their private information, 
within the organization this is not possible because activity centres are monopolists, and so do 
not have incentives to disclose their private information. Since the curve of production 
possibilities of activity centres (the efficient curve) is not known, it is not possible to affect 
efficiently resources based on financial criterions. Hence, the determination of the transfer   3
price, and so the global allocation of resources, depends, to a great extent, on the capacity of 
each group in generating "false information" and in using its market power within the 
organization. This perspective, although partially covered by the agency theory (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972, Rajan, 1992), has been little explored in literature. 
In this work we compare the problem of allocation of resources in two organizations that have 
to produce an intermediate product/service.  In one organization the intermediate 
product/service is produced by a single activity centre, i.e. the activity centre is a monopolist. 
In the other organization the intermediate product/service is produced by two identical 
activity centres, i.e. we have a duopoly. We show that the existence of market power, which 
occurs when the intermediate product/service is produced by a single activity centre, affects 
negatively the efficiency of the organization.  In particular, we show that although the 
existence of increasing returns to scale might a priori justify the existence of only one activity 
centre producing the intermediate product/service, the introduction of competition through the 
duplication of activity centres can make the organization more efficient. 
 
2. The theoretical model 
Assume a firm that produces one intermediate product and two final products. The firm is 
organized in three activity centres. One activity centre produces the intermediate product 
while the other two produce the final products. Denote the intermediate output by I1 and the 
final products by F1 and F2. The firm produces each final product using two inputs: the 
intermediate product  I1 and input  I2, which is acquired in the market (e.g., energy).  The 
intermediate product I1 uses two inputs, the work of the manager responsible for this centre, 
L, and input I2 (see figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: Firm’s production layout 
   4
Assume also that the technology is Cobb-Douglas. The two final products use a technology 
with constant returns to scale, while the intermediate product uses a technology with 
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where I2,o denotes the quantity of input I2 used in the production of the intermediate product, 
Ii,j denotes the quantity of input Ii used in the production of the final product Fj, L denotes the 
work of the manager and A0, A1 and A2 are constants. The market demand curves of the two 
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where pi is the price of the final product Fi and a1 and a2 are constants. The price of input I2, 
traded in a perfectly competitive market, is given by w2. It is assumed that the transfer price of 
input I1 is the average cost of production, w1. The average cost of production depends on both 
the cost of input I2 and the salary of the manager. The salary of the manager is equal to a fixed 
component,  W0, plus a variable component, which increases with the output of the 
intermediate input I1 and depends on the difference between the standard cost, w1
s, and the 
cost of production excluding the variable component of the salary, w1
f, where w1
f = (I2,0 w2 + 
W0)/I1. Hence, the salary of the manager is given by: 
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=        (4) 
Since the transfer price of the intermediate product equals the actual average cost of 
production, the activity centre obtains not profit. Therefore, the profit of the firm, p, equals 
the sum of the profits of the activity centres that produce the final products,  p1 and p2. 
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Using (1) and (2), the profit function of the activity centre that produces the final product F1, 
p1, is given by: 
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After simplifying (7), we obtain the demand of inputs I1 and I2 by the activity centre that 




















































            (8) 
In a similar way we obtain the demand of inputs I1 and I2 by the activity centre that produces 
the final product F2. The demand of input I1 is then given by: 
2 , 1 1 , 1 1 I I I + =                        (9) 
Using expressions (1) and (4), the actual average cost at the activity centre that produces input 
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Considering (3), and assuming that the disutility of effort is given by k2 L
2, the effort exerted 
by the manager at the activity centre that produces input I1 results from the resolution of the 
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j      (11) 
It is worth noting that the effort exerted by the manager alters (using (10)) the actual average 
cost at the activity centre that produces input I1, while this changes (using (8)) the demand of 
inputs I1 and I2 by the activity centres that produces the final products. The final solution to 
the problem results from the resolution of the system of non-linear equations represented by 
expressions (9) and (11). 
 
3. Properties of the model 
We start with considering the case where there is only one activity centre producing the 
intermediate product I1. We use simulation methods because the analytic manipulation of the 
problem is difficult and removes clarity. Future research might explore the analytic properties 
of the model. 
 
Case 1 (There is only one activity centre producing the intermediate product I1) 
In this case, the activity centre that produces the intermediate product acts as a monopolist. 
Hence, the demand is given by expression (9).  
Assuming that w1
s = 2, w2 = 1, A0 = 2, A1 = A2 = 1, a = b = j = 0,5, x = 1.1, W0 = 1, k2 = 1, a1 
=  a2 = 5 e b1 = b2 = 1, we next represent the profit of the firm, the average cost of the 
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Figure 3: Effort exerted by the manager 
 
Since that the activity centre that produces the intermediate product is monopolist, the effort 
the manager exerts is relatively small, unless the owner of the firm pays to the manager a 
relative high percentage of the difference between the standard cost and the actual cost. The 
simulation results show that the profit of the firm is maximized when the owner pays to the 
manager, as a variable component of the salary, approximately 35% of the difference between 
the standard cost and the actual cost. Hence, the manager increases his effort and the average 
cost reduces. In a sense, we obtain a better congruence between owner interests and manager 
interests. 
 
Case 2 (There are two activity centres producing the intermediate product I1)  
One way of reducing the market power that results from the fact that there is only one activity 
centre producing the intermediate output is by introducing another competitor within the 
organization. In this case, each activity centre might have a different average cost of 
production. Moreover, the activity centres that buy the intermediate products choose first the 
centre that practices a lower average cost. In figure 4 we represent the organization of the 
activity centres. 
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Figure 4: Firm’s production layout 
 
In this case, each activity centre producing the intermediate product produces only a part of 
the demand of input I1. Assuming that the average cost and the quantity produced at activity 
centre (0, j), j = 1, 2 are, respectively, w0,j and I0,j, the overall average cost of the intermediate 
product, which will be used by the activity centres that produce the final products, is given by:     
1
2 , 0 2 , 0 1 , 0 1 , 0
1 I
I w I w
w
+
=                    (12) 
Where I1 = I0,1 + I0,2 As observed above, it is assumed that the activity centre that has a lower 
average cost produces a higher quantity. Moreover, the distribution between the two activity 
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                    (13) 
Considering the same values used in Case 1, except that W0 = 0,5 (w1’ = 2, w2 = 1, A0 = 2, A1 
= A2 = 1, a = b = j = 0,5, x = 1.1, W0 = 0,5, k2 = 1, a1 =  a2 = 5 e b1 = b2 = 1), we next 
represent the profit of the firm, the average cost of the intermediate product and the effort 
exerted by the manager as the parameter k1 changes. 














Figure 5: Increase of the profit and decrease of the average cost of the intermediate output 











Figure 6: Increase of the effort exerted by the (two) managers responsible for the activity 
centres that produce the intermediate output 
 
As figure 5 shows, the profit of the firm is maximized when the owner pays to the two 
managers, as a variable component of the salary, approximately 35% of the difference 
between the standard cost and the actual cost. More importantly, the profit of the firm 
increases when we introduce competition, although there are increasing returns to scale in the 
production of the intermediate output (x = 1.1 > 1). 
 
4. Conclusion 
It is well known that the absence of competition in the markets induces a loss of economic 
welfare.  Similarly, within organizations, the market power that results from the fact that an 
intermediate product is produced by a single activity centre induces an inefficient allocation   10 
of resources. This occurs because the activity centre does not have incentives to disclose 
information concerning the (efficient) curve of production possibilities. Consequently, the 
power to impose the transfer price is the main factor affecting the allocation of resources.  
Although it might be a priori more efficient to use a single activity centre to produce an 
intermediate input when there are increasing returns to scale, in this work we show that this is 
not always the case. Thus, comparing a firm that has a monopolist activity centre producing 
an intermediate product with another firm where the same intermediate product is produced 
by two activity centres, we show that, even if there are increasing returns to scale, the firm 
might become more efficient duplicating activity centres. 
The great question we should pose is to know how the production processes should be 
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